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l. INTRODUCTION 
Crawford v. Washington was a groundbreaking decision that radically redefined 
the scope of the Confrontation Clause. 1 Nowhere has the impact of Crawford and 
the debate over its meaning been stronger than in the context of domestic violence 
prosecutions. The particular circumstances that surround domestic violence cases-
911 calls that record cries for help and accusations, excited utterances made to 
responding police officers, and the persistent reluctance of complaining witnesses 
to cooperate with prosecutors-combine to make the introduction of "out-of-court 
statements" a critical component of many domestic violence prosecutions. Be-
cause domestic violence cases are subject to a unique set of political and 
institutional forces, it is necessary to appreciate those influences to fully under-
stand trial courts' interpretation of the scope and import of the Crawford decision. 
As a public defender in the Bronx, I witnessed, first hand, the excitement and 
confusion that followed the Crawford decision at the trial level. In the immediate 
aftermath of Crawford, e-mails flew about our office proclaiming the death knell of 
"evidence based prosecutions," the practice of prosecuting domestic violence 
cases without the cooperation of the complaining witness. In court, defense 
attorneys eagerly pushed broad interpretations of the new decision, arguing that 
the district attorney could no longer rely solely on 911 tapes and police testimony 
to prosecute defendants in domestic violence cases. In this context, a seemingly 
typical domestic assault case, People v. Moscat, was winding its way through the 
court system? 
Mr. Moscat was charged with hitting and threatening his girlfriend. The police 
had been summoned to the scene by a 911 call, but several weeks after Mr. 
Moscat's arrest, the complaining witness indicated she was not willing to cooper-
* Staff Attorney, The Bronx Defenders. J.D., Yale Law School; M.A., Harvard Kennedy School of Govern-
ment; B.A. Swarthmore College. 
I. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Crawford abrogated Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (permitting the admission of 
out-of-court statements that bore adequate "indicia of reliability") and held that the Confrontation Clause bars 
statements that are "testimonial in nature," unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The Confrontation Clause states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him .... "U.S. CaNST. amend. VI. 
2. My office, The Bronx Defenders, represented Mr. Mosca! from his arraignment through to the eventual 
dismissal of the charges. I became personally involved with the case after Judge Greenberg issued his decision 
interpreting Crawford in People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) and co-authored the brief 
requesting that the court vacate the decision. 
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ate with his prosecution. The case seemed to provide an ideal opportunity for the 
trial judge, The Honorable Ethan Greenberg, to write the first decision in New 
York State interpreting the scope of Crawford and its impact on prosecutors' 
practice of relying on out-of-court statements to prosecute domestic violence 
cases.3 In an environment that has become uniquely sensitized to the needs of the 
prosecution and the complaining witness, Judge Greenberg wrote a decision 
interpreting Crawford in the narrowest possible terms. The Moscat decision has 
been one of the most frequently cited cases in the country interpreting Crawford.4 
Yet, unbeknownst to the numerous courts citing the decision, when Moscat was 
written neither side nor the judge had heard the 911 tape; the issues were not 
briefed by either side; and the reasoning of the decision was based upon facts 
which turned out to be entirely false. 5 No case better illustrates the peculiar 
circumstances that shape interpretations of the Crawford decision in the domestic 
violence context. 
Through the lens of Moscat, this Essay seeks to identify how trial courts' narrow 
readings of Crawford have been influenced by the forces that shape the way 
domestic violence cases are prosecuted. By recognizing how the dynamics of 
domestic-violence prosecutions mold judicial reasoning, one can better understand 
and evaluate trial courts' post-Crawford Sixth Amendment decisions. In tum, 
post-Crawford jurisprudence reveals a great deal about the environment in which 
domestic violence cases are tried, the presumptions that shape judicial opinions in 
the domestic violence context, and the obstacles many defendants face when they 
are accused of committing such crimes. 
II. RoBERT's RuLEs: THE CoNFRONTATION CLAUSE PRIOR TO CRAwFoRD 
The plain language of the Sixth Amendment appears to guarantee defendants an 
absolute right to confront their accusers in court.6 But as Justice Scalia noted in 
Crawford, the Sixth Amendment's text alone does not resolve the issue.7 One 
could plausibly interpret the Sixth Amendment as guaranteeing only the right to 
3. The actual circumstances behind the Moscat decision were ultimately revealed to the public months later in 
a New York Times article by Sabrina Tavernise. See Sabrina Tavernise, Legal Precedent Doesn't Let Facts Stand 
in the Way, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at A I. 
4. See, e.g., People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 90 (Ill. App. Ct., 2005); State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 302 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004); People v. Isaac, No. 23398/02, 2004 WL 1389219, at *3 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. June 16, 2004); 
State v. Williams, No. 20368, 2005 WL 120054, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2005); State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 
1262, 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004); Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless 
Prosecution, 28 SEATILE. U. L. REV. 301, 322 nn. 143, 148 (2005); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. 
Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511,562 n.269 
(2005). At the time this essay was written, approximately eleven months after the Moscat decision was issued, 
Westlaw listed forty separate cases and scholarly articles on the subject of Crawford that cited Moscat. 
5. See Tavernise, supra note 3 at A I. 
6. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the witnesses 
against him .... "U.S. CaNST. amend. VI. 
7. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,42 (2004). 
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confront those individuals who actually testify at trial. 8 Prior to the Crawford 
decision, courts had largely conftated Confrontation Clause analysis with the rules 
governing the admission of hearsay. This was the result of the Supreme Court's 
determination that the Sixth Amendment did not bar the admission of all out-of-
court statements, but rather excluded only statements of questionable reliability. In 
Ohio v. Roberts, the Court explained that the Sixth Amendment did not proscribe 
the admission of hearsay if the declarant was shown to be unavailable for trial and 
the statement bore adequate "indicia of reliability."9 Moreover, the Court held that 
hearsay falling within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" was presumptively 
reliable and that its admission posed no Sixth Amendment difficulty. 10 Statements 
that failed to qualify for admission under these exceptions could still be found 
admissible if there were a separate showing that the statement had "particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness." 11 
While the Court professed in later decisions that it had been careful not to equate 
the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with the general rules governing the 
admission of hearsay statements, 12 in practice Confrontation Clause analysis was 
rapidly subsumed by the hearsay rules. Even the requirement that the prosecution 
demonstrate that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial, which arguably 
bestowed some additional Sixth Amendment limitations on the admission of 
out-of-court statements, was substantially eroded in subsequent cases. Six years 
after the decision in Roberts, in a case examining the admission of the out-of-court 
statement of a non-testifying co-conspirator, the Supreme Court held that Roberts 
merely established an unavailability requirement for prior testimony, not for all 
out-of-court statements. 13 Finally, in White v. Illinois, the unavailability require-
ment was largely eliminated when the Court refused to impose such a requirement 
on the introduction of statements that fit within the hearsay exceptions for excited 
utterances and statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 14 
By 1992, an out-of-court statement which was deemed to satisfy a hearsay 
exception was thus generally admissible under the Sixth Amendment as well. 
The merger of Confrontation Clause analysis and the hearsay rules was 
vulnerable to a variety of criticisms. First, by focusing solely on the reliability of 
the statement, the Roberts framework ignored the "strong symbolic purpose" 
8. See id. 
9. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 ( 1980). 
10. /d. 
II. /d. 
12. See. e.g .• Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805. 814 ( 1990) ("Although we have recognized that hearsay rules and 
the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values. we have also been careful not to equate 
the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements."). 
13. See United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387,394 (1986) ("Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical 
proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the 
declarant is unavailable."). 
14. See White v.lllinois. 502 U.S. 346,356-57 (1992). 
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served by a face-to-face confrontation between the accused and his accuser. As the 
Court had explained in Coy v. Iowa, "[t]here is something deep in human nature 
that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as essential to 
a fair trial in a criminal prosecution." 15 Second, the exceptions to the general 
prohibition against hearsay were themselves criticized as commentators ques-
tioned the psychological presumptions used to justify them. For example, the 
excited utterance rule is based upon the questionable presumption that a person 
under the sway of excitement caused by a startling event will lack the reflective 
capacity essential for fabrication and, consequently, that the person's statements 
should be considered spontaneous and reliable. 16 This presumption has been 
attacked by a host of critics who have asserted not only that empirical evidence 
suggests that it takes little time for people to craft a lie, but that regardless of 
whether a person deliberately lies, an excited state does nothing to ensure that a 
statement is free of honest mistake due to erroneous perception or memory. 17 
Finally, as Justice Scalia detailed in the Crawford decision, the subjective nature of 
the Roberts framework, which allowed for the admission of hearsay testimony if a 
statement was shown to have "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," 
resulted in contradictory holdings in which various courts found different state-
ments to be reliable based on contradictory factors. 18 
In 1992, Justice Thomas expressed his concern that Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence had "evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text 
and history of the Clause itself." 19 In a concurrence which would largely presage 
the majority opinion in Crawford, Thomas described the historical basis for the 
right to confront witnesses and challenged the entire Roberts framework. 20 It 
would be twelve more years before the Court finally consigned Ohio v. Roberts to 
the dust bin of history. When Crawford was decided, however, it challenged 
longstanding prosecutorial practices and threaten to upset an entire methodology 
for the treatment of domestic violence cases. 
III. CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court reversed decades of Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence holding that, no matter how reliable, a "testimonial statement" 
15. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988)(quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,404 (1965)). 
16. See A viva Orenstein, "MY GOD!": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay 
Rule, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 159, 173 (1997). 
17. /d. at 178-82 (outlining various critiques of the excited utterance doctrine's presumption that statements 
are more accurate because they are made in response to a particularly startling event). 
18. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-66 (2004) (noting, for example, that one court found a 
statement more reliable because the witness was in custody and charged with a crime, thereby making the 
statement more clearly against her penal interest, while another court found a statement more reliable because the 
witness was not in custody and not a suspect). 
19. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,358 (1992). 
20. !d. at 361. 
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cannot be admitted against a defendant unless the accused has had an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness who made the statement.21 The Court's 
"about-face" was predicated in large part upon historical analysis which suggested 
that the Framers intended the Confrontation Clause to prevent a reoccurrence of 
the abusive method of "trial by affidavit," once practiced by magistrates in 
sixteenth and seventeenth century England. 22 The most notorious of such trials 
was the prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh, in which the defendant was convicted 
and sentenced to death largely on the basis of a deposition taken from his alleged 
accomplice, Lord Cobham. At his trial, Sir Walter purportedly demanded that the 
magistrates "Call my accuser before my face."23 The m-agistrates refused, how-
ever, and elected instead to simply read Lord Cobham's written ex-parte state-
ments to the jury. 24 The Crawford court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause 
must be understood principally as a guard against such unfairness, barring the 
introduction of "testimonial statements," but unconcerned with "the off-hand, 
overheard remark" which bore no resemblance to the historic abusive practices of 
the English magistrates?5 
Unfortunately, the Crawford court forbore spelling out a comprehensive 
definition of "testimonial statements," and instead provided three possible defini-
tions for this essential concept. One proferred definition describes such statements 
as "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent."26 Alternatively, the 
Court suggested that testimonial statements might be defined as "extrajudicial 
statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions."27 Finally, the Court characterized 
"testimonial statements" more broadly as "statements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that 
the statement would be available for use at a later trial."28 Nonetheless, beyond 
hinting that all three definitions bear some essential relationship to the abusive 
practices that gave rise to the Sixth Amendment, the Court was silent as to how 
Crawford should be applied to situations that do not precisely fit the model of a 
police station interrogation.29 The dissent in Crawford criticized the majority's 
decision to leave the "thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of 
state prosecutors" in the dark about what evidence is or is not constitutionally 
21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68. 
22. !d. at 43-44. 
23. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,44 (2004) (citations omitted). 
24. !d. 
25. !d. at 51. 
26. !d. 
27. !d. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 ( 1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
28. !d. at 52 (citation omitted). 
29. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (2004). Crawford involved a statement made by the 
defendant's wife to the police in a tape-recorded interrogation at the police station. 
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admissible.30 The majority, however, adhered to the Court's longstanding policy of 
limiting decisions to the specific facts before it.31 
By allowing trial courts to resolve for themselves the proper definition of 
"testimonial," the Crawford decision set off a vociferous debate about the scope of 
the newly revitalized right of confrontation. Not surprisingly, several courts leapt 
at the opportunity to shape the contours of this area of law. Some of the earliest and 
most influential decisions exploring the contours of the newly revitalized right of 
confrontation were domestic violence courts. To understand the reasoning behind 
some of those decisions, it is important first to grasp the transformation, occurring 
over the last two decades, in how prosecutors and judges treat domestic violence 
cases. 
IV. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE EMERGENCE OF "EVIDENCE BASED PROSECUTIONS" 
Over the last two decades there has been a dramatic shift in the treatment of 
domestic violence cases as legislatures, courts, law enforcement authorities, and 
the public have grown increasingly aware of the scope and seriousness of domestic 
violence. 32 Public awareness campaigns, legislated alterations of police arrest 
practices, and the creation of specialized courts where judges are educated to be 
sensitive to various domestic violence issues, are just some of the developments 
that have profoundly altered the way domestic violence is viewed and treated in 
this country. 33 
Historically, the criminal justice system has been slow to recognize the criminal 
nature of domestic abuse. Until the last few decades, the legal system viewed 
domestic violence as largely a private family matter?4 The English common law 
upon which the American legal system is based openly endorsed a husband's right 
to physically "chastise" his spouse.35 While a number of states adopted laws 
30. /d. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Oddly, the dissent failed to include the thousands of defense 
attorneys who also would have appreciated a clear declaration of the new rule. 
31. One expression of the Court's rationale for this policy can be found in United States v. Fruehauf 
Such opinions, such advance expressions of legal judgment upon issues which remain unfocused 
because they are not pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a 
question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument 
exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests, 
we have consistently refused to give. 
365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961). 
32. See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1182 
(2002). 
33. See Amanda Dekki, Punishment Or Rehabilitation? The Case For State-Mandated Guidelines For 
Barterer Intervention Programs In Domestic Violence Cases, 18 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 549, 554 (2004). 
34. See Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements On An Effective 
Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1285, 1288-89 (2000) (providing a historical perspective on domestic violence). 
35. /d. (citing EvES. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 
174-75 (James A. Inciardi ed., 2d ed. 1996) and Nadine Taub, Adult Domestic Violence: The Law's Response, 8 
VICTIMOLOGY 152, 153 (1983)). 
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against domestic violence in the late nineteenth century, such laws typically were 
applied only in the most egregious circumstances involving severe injury.36 In the 
1970s and 1980s, the tide finally began to shift, as policy makers began to identify 
domestic violence as a criminal matter that required public action. Advocates 
successfully focused attention on the issue of domestic violence, and the govern-
ment began supporting shelters for battered women, batterer intervention pro-
grams, specialized prosecution teams, and empirical studies on domestic vio-
lence.37 
Despite growing political support for domestic violence victims, the criminal 
justice system was criticized in the 1980s and early 1990s for failing to adopt more 
effective strategies for combating domestic abuse.38 Partly in response to this 
criticism, specialized courts were developed for handling domestic violence cases, 
and judges received sensitivity training in the issues surrounding domestic 
violence. However, as judges reinterpreted their role in the legal system "as 
stopping the violence, [and] not just deciding the case,"39 their ability to act in their 
traditional role as impartial arbiters of the law was dangerously undermined.40 
Judges, in their new role as "those who stop the violence," became invested in the 
success of anti-domestic violence efforts.41 One such effort was the use of 
"evidence based prosecutions," the prosecution of defendants without the coopera-
tion of the complaining witness.42 
The term "evidence based prosecution" or "victimless prosecution" describes a 
prosecution that relies on the use of out-of-court statements to establish the guilt of 
the defendant when the complaining witness either refuses or is otherwise unable 
to cooperate with the prosecution. To prosecute a defendant without the participa-
tion of the complaining witness, prosecutors seek to introduce statements the 
complainant may have made to a third party, such as a 911 operator or a police 
36. See id.; see also Dekki, supra note 33, at 553-54. 
37. /d. at 554. 
38. See Jennifer Thompson, Who:~ Afraid of Judicial Activism? Reconceptualizing A Traditional Paradigm in 
the Context of Specialized Domestic Violence Court Programs, 56 ME. L. REV. 407,419 (2004)'(describing the 
judicial system's historic failure to effectively combat domestic abuse); see also Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. 
Knipps, Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence: The Case for a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. 
REv. L 10-12 (1999-2000) (criticizing traditional judicial responses to domestic violence and suggesting that 
courts must adopt new strategies to combat spousal abuse). 
39. Kaye & Knipps, supra note 38, at 2 (explaining that New York City was r:reating specialized domestic 
violence courts "that seek to change business as usual by casting the judicial role as stopping the violence, not just 
deciding the case") (internal quotations omitted). 
40. Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. Rev. 33,44 
(2000) (explaining that training judges in domestic violence issues "is likely to produce in many domestic 
violence court judges an identification with the domestic violence victim that might adversely affect their ability 
to be fair and impartial adjudicators of cases in which the issue of domestic violence is contested"). 
41. /d.; see also Friedman & McCormick, supra note 32, at 1192 nn.79-80. 
42. See Friedman & McCormick, supra note 32, at 1190 n.72 (noting that approximately thirty-five to forty 
percent of jurisdictions were prosecuting domestic violence cases without the cooperation of the complaining 
witness in 1995, and that some jurisdictions did so in the majority of their cases). 
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officer at the crime scene. These statements often are introduced as "excited 
utterances" under an exception to the general rule against hearsay and are offered 
up "for the truth," i.e. as a factual account of the alleged assault.43 Prosecutors 
consider evidence based prosecutions to be important weapons in the fight against 
domestic violence because many complaining witnesses recant or refuse to 
cooperate with the prosecution of their partners.44 Indeed, it has been estimated in 
some jurisdictions that as many as eighty to ninety percent of complaining 
witnesses in domestic violence cases recant their accusations or refuse to cooper-
ate with the prosecution.45 Evidence based prosecutions operate hand-in-hand with 
prosecutors' "no drop" policies, which ensure that a prosecution is pursued 
regardless of the expressed desire of the complaining witness.46 A variety of 
reasons have been attributed to complaining witnesses' determination not to 
cooperate, including fear of retaliation, low self-esteem, financial dependence on 
the defendant and sympathy for the assailant.47 Alternatively, complaining wit-
nesses may absent themselves from the trial because the accusations are untrue or 
exaggerated or they have committed inappropriate or even criminal acts them-
selves. Regardless of the reason, it is clear that complaining witnesses' refusal to 
help the government prosecute defendants for domestic abuse poses a significant 
obstacle to utilizing the criminal justice system to combat domestic violence. 
Evidence based prosecutions largely are considered the government's most effec-
tive response to the difficulty posed by reluctant complaining witnesses.48 
43. See id. at 1222 ("The excited utterance exception ... provides that, '[a] statement relating to a startling 
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition."') (quoting FED. R. Evm. 803(2)). Rule 803 does not require that the declarant be unavailable. See FED. 
R. Evm. 803(2). More than forty states have closely followed Rule 803 in their own codification of the excited 
utterance rule. See Friedman & McCormick, supra note 32 at 1222. 
44. See Andrew King-Ries, supra note 4 (describing the importance of evidence based prosecutions in the fight 
against domestic violence when complaining witnesses do not cooperate with the prosecution); see also Adam M. 
Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid: Applying Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic 
Violence Cases, 38 PROSECUTOR 14 (2004) (emphasizing the value of evidence based prosecutions in light of 
many complaining witnesses' determination not to participate in the prosecution of their partner). 
45. Fowler v. Indiana, 809 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in 
Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 IND. L. REv. 687, 709 n.76 (2003)). 
46. See Renee Esfandiary & Krista Newkirk, Interview with the Honorable John E. Klock of the Alexandria 
Circuit Court Defending Mandatory Arrest, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 241, 241 ( 1997); see also Friedman & 
McCormick supra note 32, at 1188. 
47. Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 IND. L. REv. 687, 
709 n.76 (2003) (citing Thomas I. Kirsch II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims be Forced to 
Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383, 392-99 (2001)). 
These reasons tend to presume the guilt of the defendant, a proposition that can rankle defense attorneys, 
particularly when such reasoning is relied upon by judges as well as prosecutors and advocates. Indeed, there is a 
legitimate concern that a complaining witness' absence from a defendant's trial will actually be held against the 
defendant because the trier of fact presumes that the absence is a symptom of domestic abuse and therefore an 
indication that such abuse actually has occurred. 
48. See Fowler, 809 N.E.2d at 965 (suggesting that the appropriate response for the government when the 
complaining witness is uncooperative is to rely upon the introduction of out-of-court statements via the hearsay 
exceptions); Andrew King-Ries, supra note 4. 
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The Crawford decision, however, poses a direct threat to the use of evidence 
based prosecutions as a tool for fighting domestic violence. If statements to 911 
operators and police officers are considered "testimonial," then their admission 
would be barred under Crawford's Sixth Amendment analysis. Proponents of 
domestic violence reforms and prosecutors regard evidence based prosecutions as 
a critical part of the fight against domestic violence and have urged courts to refuse 
to apply the protections outlined in Crawford to domestic abusers.49 When 
specialized domestic violence trial courts interpret the meaning of Crawford and 
the scope of the Sixth Amendment, they are implicitly ruling on the viability of a 
prosecutorial practice that many believe is an important tool in the fight against 
domestic violence. Given the determination of judges in domestic violence courts 
to recast their role "as stopping the violence," decisions interpreting Crawford in 
the domestic violence context must be viewed with a particularly critical eye and 
an understanding of the particular interests at stake. 
V. PEOPLE v. MoscAT 
It is, of course, difficult to demonstrate conclusively that judges' concerns about 
prosecutors' ability to bring evidence based prosecutions are dominating courts' 
interpretations of Crawford. There is, however, ample evidence that judges have 
come to regard themselves as active participants in the fight against domestic 
violence.50 Moreover, there is little question that a broad reading of Crawford 
threatens to eliminate a valued prosecutorial tool in that fight. Judges are unlikely, 
however, to undermine their traditional image as neutral arbiters of the law by 
explicitly linking their decisions interpreting Crawford to their interest in support-
ing the fight against domestic violence. Instead, courts ruling that Crawford does 
not bar the introduction of out-of-court statements by domestic assault victims 
tend to assert that the statements were not made in contemplation of trial and do 
not discuss the larger impact a broad interpretation of Crawford might have had 
upon evidence based prosecutions. 51 Thus, while the forces that might influence 
judges in the domestic violence context can be readily identified, textual references 
to such forces in published decisions are rare. A few cases, however, have offered 
veiled hints that courts are concerned with the impact that Crawford could have 
upon evidence based prosecutions. In Fowler v. Indiana, the Indiana Court of 
Appeals acknowledged "the frustration experienced by the State when a victim 
refuses to testify," and suggested that the best way to resolve the dilemma posed by 
uncooperative complaining witnesses was to introduce out-of-court statements.52 
The case which best exposes the influence that domestic violence concerns has had 
49. See e.g., Adam M. Krischer, supra note 44. 
50. Kaye & Knipps, supra note 38, at 2. 
51. See e.g., People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 872-74 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004). 
52. Fowler v. Indiana, 809 N.E.2d 960,965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
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upon courts' interpretations of Crawford is a much cited Bronx Criminal Court 
decision, People v. Moscat. 53 
The strange events that surround the People v. Moscat decision make sense only 
when one recognizes that the decision was fashioned by a judge in a specialized 
domestic violence court with the fate of evidence based prosecutions arguably 
hanging in the balance. Moscat appeared on its face to be a fairly typical 
misdemeanor domestic assault case. On August 11, 2003, a 911 phone call brought 
police to a Bronx housing complex, where they arrested Mr. Moscat and charged 
him with striking his girlfriend and threatening her. At arraignment, Mr. Moscat 
was released on his own recognizance (no bail was set), and the case was sent to 
the misdemeanor specialized domestic violence courtroom. After a few court 
dates, during which discovery was provided and motions were filed, the assistant 
district attorney conceded that the prosecution did not have the cooperation of the 
complaining witness, but stated that the government intended to proceed despite 
her absence. Not long thereafter, the Supreme Court handed down the Crawford 
decision and set the courthouse ablaze with speculation about the future of 
evidence based prosecutions. 
On March 25, 2004, only 17 days after the Crawford decision was issued, the 
Moscat case was called in the Bronx Criminal Court Specialized Domestic 
Violence Part before Judge Ethan Greenberg. Defense counsel (an attorney from 
the Bronx Defenders54) explained on the record that the complaining witness had 
contacted the Bronx Defenders and expressed her intent not to cooperate with the 
prosecution of Mr. Moscat. The court asked if the defense had heard the 911 tape, 
and defense counsel responded that the prosecution had not yet turned it over. In 
fact, the tape was still in the process of being ordered, so neither the defense, the 
judge, nor the assigned assistant district attorney had heard the recording of the 
911 call. Nonetheless, after a brief conference at the bench, Judge Greenberg 
solicited an application from defense counsel to bar the admission of the 911 
recording. The assistant district attorney opposed the motion and the case was 
adjourned for decision. Despite the fact that this issue would potentially determine 
the fate of evidence based prosecutions in the Bronx, no briefs or legal argument 
were solicited or submitted. On the very same day the oral motion was made, the 
court issued a ten-page written decision finding that 911 calls categorically do not 
qualify as testimonial evidence under Crawford. 55 The court's decision was based 
primarily on the blanket assumption that a 911 call reporting domestic violence is 
53. 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004). 
54. The Bronx Defenders is a public defender organization in the Bronx serving indigent clients that have been 
charged with crimes. The author is currently a staff attorney. 
55. The date of the decision certainly suggested that the Judge had, in fact, written much of the decision before 
the issue was even raised. Judge Greenberg later asserted that the decision was erroneously dated March 25th, and 
that it had, in fact, been issued a day later, on the 26th. See People v. Moscat, No. 2003BX044511 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
Feb. 10, 2005). 
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"a call for help," made by a desperate victim, without contemplation of future legal 
proceedings. 56 
Approximately three weeks after Judge Greenberg issued his decision, defense 
counsel was provided with a copy of the 911 tape at issue. The tape revealed that 
the facts described in Judge Greenberg's decision were shockingly distinct from 
the actual circumstances of the call. In contrast to the call described in the Moscat 
ruling, the actual caller on the 911 recording was not the complaining witness, but 
rather a neighbor who spoke in a calm voice, may or may not have had first-hand 
knowledge of the alleged assault, and made the call approximately eight hours 
after the assault was alleged to have occurred. 57 
The Moscat decision is particularly revealing. First, the court's opinion is based 
entirely on factual assumptions which turned out to be false even in the specific 
case before it. In his decision Judge Greenberg stated: 
Typically, in such a call a woman tells the 911 operator (in New York City, a 
civilian police employee) that her boyfriend has just shot, stabbed or beaten her 
(and may be about to do so again); usually, the woman hurriedly answers a few 
questions from the operator and then asks the operator to send police officers 
and an ambulance to her aid. The present case fits that description. 58 
In fact, the present case did not fit that description at all. The complaining witness 
did not make the phone call; it was made by a neighbor. Moreover, the call was not 
made contemporaneously with the alleged assault, but approximately nine hours 
later. 
Judge Greenberg's presumptions regarding the circumstances in which 911 calls 
are made illustrate an extremely biased and anti-defendant perspective. Further, 
they demonstrate an urgency, on the court's part, to establish that Crawford does 
not impose an obstacle to evidence based prosecutions. Despite the fact that the 
judge never heard the 911 tape or any testimony regarding the allegations in the 
complaint, his decision conjured an image of a desperate plea for help in the midst 
of a violent assault. There is no question that domestic assault occurs at an 
appalling rate in society. It is enormously troubling, however, that the supposed 
neutral arbiter of the law was comfortable assuming that these facts were always 
true and was willing to base his legal reasoning on those faulty assumptions. 
The faulty assumptions in Judge Greenberg's decision lend proof to what many 
practitioners regard as judges' predisposition to believe the prosecution's version 
of domestic assaults. A 911 call can be interpreted in at least two very different 
ways. First, a 911 call can be a desperate cry for help motivated solely by the 
caller's desire for safety. This is how the prosecution is likely to portray the call, 
and it is the image that Judge Greenberg explicitly adopted. Alternatively, a 911 
56. See Moscat, 777 N. Y.S.2d at 880. 
57. See Tavernise, supra note 3 at A I. 
58. Mosca/, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 878. 
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call can be an accusation made directly to the police with the intention of getting 
the defendant arrested.59 Under this view, the call is far more likely to be 
considered testimonial, and the substance of the call is less likely to be presumed 
true. 
To appreciate the full implications of judicial bias in domestic violence cases, 
one must recognize that the majority of domestic violence cases in the Bronx are 
likely to be tried by judges, not juries. In New York, the prosecution is able to 
eliminate the defendant's right to a jury trial by reducing the misdemeanor charge 
from a class A misdemeanor, which carries a maximum sentence of one year in jail, 
to a class B misdemeanor, which has a maximum sentence of ninety days in jail.60 
Most charges can be reduced simply by charging the crime as an attempt.61 For 
example, to avoid a jury trial, the assistant district attorney can reduce a charge of 
assault in the third degree (a class A misdemeanor) to attempted assault in the third 
degree (a class B misdemeanor). This means that the judge who determined the 
admissibility of the 911 call might be the ultimate finder of fact should the case go 
to trial. 
Imagine if Mr. Moscat's case had gone to trial in front of Judge Greenberg. At 
trial, Mr. Moscat might argue that the complaining witness was lying about the 
alleged assault. The defendant, however, would have to convince the judge that the 
complaining witness was lying when the Judge had already assumed, without even 
hearing the content of the 911 recording, that the complaining witness made the 
call as a plea for help without contemplation of a future trial. A judge who assumes 
such facts is clearly not a judge a defendant can confidently trust to presume 
innocence and entertain the possibility that the complaining witness had fabricated 
her version of events. 
Moscat illustrates far more than one domestic violence judge's predisposition to 
believe that allegations of domestic assault are true. Judge Greenberg's willingness 
to presume facts and his eagerness to issue a decision regarding the scope of 
Crawford is best explained by the court's desire to protect a practice which is 
59. See Friedman & McCormick, supra note 32. 
60. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW.§ 340.40(2) (McKinney 2004). 
In any local criminal court a defendant who has entered a plea of not guilty to an information 
which charges a misdemeanor must be accorded a jury trial, conducted pursuant to article three 
hundred sixty, except that in the New York city criminal court tbe trial of an information which 
charges a misdemeanor for which the authorized term of imprisonment is not more than six months 
must be a single judge trial. The defendant may at any time before trial waive a jury trial in the 
manner prescribed in subdivision two of section 320.10, and consent to a single judge trial. 
ld.; see also People v. Burke, 715 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2000) (holding that the reduction of tbe 
charges from class A misdemeanors to class B attempt misdemeanors, thereby depriving defendant of a jury trial 
pursuant to N.Y. CRIM PRoc. LAW.§ 340.40(2), does not constitute an abuse ofprosecutorial privilege). 
61. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § ll0.05(8) (McKinney 2004) ("An attempt to commit a crime is a ... Class B 
misdemeanor when the crime attempted is a misdemeanor."). 
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regarded as an important tool in "stopping the violence."62 Judge Greenberg 
acknowledged that, "[t]he [Crawford] issue is of special importance to courts-
like this one-dedicated to trying cases of alleged domestic violence."63 In 
Moscat, the court identified the unique impact the Crawford issue could have upon 
the world of domestic violence prosecutions by potentially barring the introduction 
of critical evidence.64 There is little question that the principal purpose of the 
Moscat decision was to resolve the larger question of whether Crawford would 
prohibit evidence based prosecutions. 
Moscat suggests that decisions interpreting Crawford in the domestic violence 
context must be viewed with particular care. Judge Greenberg did not merely 
presume facts that supported his ultimate determination; his analysis also ignored 
alternative arguments suggesting that 911 calls should be considered testimonial. 
Judge Greenberg never considered the fact that New York State explicitly encour-
ages 911 operators to gather evidence for use at trial. In 2003, the New York State 
Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence issued the following statement in 
its bulletin entitled "Making the Case": 
From communications (911 or police dispatch) to the first responding officer, 
the supervisor, the investigator and administrative staff, each and every 
professional involved in the case has an opportunity-and responsibility-to 
help keep the victim safe and hold the offender accountable . ... We encourage 
you to see the case from all perspectives and figure out how you can do your 
part to help build a good case.65 
Similarly, Judge Greenberg made the bare assertion that 911 callers were 
unaware that their statements would be available for prosecutoria1 use simply by 
analyzing the factual scenario of a woman making such a call after "her boyfriend 
has just shot, stabbed or beaten her."66 Notably, Moscat did not explore the public's 
understanding of how 911 calls are used. In People v. Cortes, a case not involving 
domestic violence, Bronx Supreme Court Justice Phyllis Skloot-Bamberger noted 
that "an objective reasonable person knows that when he or she reports a crime the 
statement will be used in an investigation and at proceedings relating to a 
prosecution."67 Callers using 911 generally know that the information they provide 
will be used for further investigation, and they often refuse to give their names for 
62. Kaye & Knipps. supra note 38 at 2. It is notable that Judge Kaye. the co-author of the article calling for 
judges to reinterpret their role as stopping the violence is the Chief Judge of the State of New York. As Chief 
Judge. Judge Kaye's responsibilities include overseeing approximately 1,200 state judges, one of whom is Judge 
Greenberg. 
63. People v. Mosca!, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875,878 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004). 
64. /d. at 877-78. 
65. NEW YORK STATE 0FACE OF THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, BEST PRACTICES IN CASE DEVELOP-
MENT: MAKING THE CASE (2003), at http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/public_awarenesslbulletins/fall2003/bestpractic-
es.html (emphasis added). 
66. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 878 (a factual scenario, of course, which had not actually occurred). 
67. People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401,415 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) 
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this very reason.68 The fact that many 911 callers have been educated to 
understand that their statements will be available for use by both the prosecution 
and the police suggests that such calls would classify as "testimonial statements." 
It is important to recognize that courts interpreting Crawford in a domestic 
violence context are likely to be influenced by judges' institutional interests in 
preserving evidence based prosecutions. As a result, these decisions may fail to 
explore alternative arguments that, in fact, suggest that "[t]he 911 call reporting a 
crime preserved on tape is the modem equivalent, made possible by technology, to 
the depositions taken by magistrates."69 
Judge Greenberg was willing to assume all the facts necessary to conclude that 
911 calls are not testimonial for the purposes of Crawford analysis. Moreover, he 
decided this pivotal legal issue without briefing. It is difficult to conclude that a 
judge who departed so egregiously from accepted norms of judicial behavior and 
who was operating in the context of a legal system in which judges are encouraged 
to consider themselves active opponents against domestic violence, was not 
influenced by the desire to maintain the viability of evidence based prosecutions. 
The Bronx Defenders did file a motion requesting that Judge Greenberg vacate 
the Moscat decision in light of its factual errors and the judge's misapprehension, 
in our view, of the meaning and scope of Crawford.70 Judge Greenberg denied the 
motion to vacate on February 10, 2005, stating that the logic of his decision, while 
regrettably based upon incorrect facts, stated the correct rule for applying Craw-
ford. In the unpublished denial of the motion to vacate, Judge Greenberg argued 
that the Moscat decision was narrowly tailored to apply only to those 911 calls 
which were, in fact, calls for help.71 This claim, however, was belied by the fact 
that the judge had found that the call in question was a call for help based solely on 
the assertion that it was a 911 call in a domestic assault case. The denial of the 
motion to vacate included a specific acknowledgement that the Moscat decision 
was "useful to [the court's] own institutional purposes" in light of the need to 
determine whether evidence based prosecutions could continue to go forward.72 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As the Moscat case aptly illustrates, the potential for Crawford to eliminate 
prosecutors' ability to pursue evidence based prosecutions is likely to have a 
profound influence upon courts' interpretations of the scope of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront witnesses. In order to fully understand many Crawford 
68. /d.; see a/so FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
nypdlhtmllmiscpdfaq2.html#3 (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) (allowing for anonymous 911 calls). 
69. See Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2dat415. 
70. I co-authored the motion to vacate with David Ziff, a talented Columbia Law Student who interned at the 
Bronx Defenders. 
71. People v. Moscat, No. 2003BX044511 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Feb. 10, 2005). 
72. /d. 
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decisions, one must appreciate the unique dynamics of domestic violence prosecu-
tions and the unusual role that many judges adopt in such cases. The Moscat case is 
more than simply an interesting case study in erroneous fact finding. Ultimately, 
Moscat should act as a warning to all those concerned with preserving a 
defendant's right to a fair trial. Regardless of whether one believes that a 911 
phone call is admissible under Crawford as a call for help, or inadmissible as an 
accusation made with the knowledge that it would be available for use at trial, 
Moscat serves to emphasize the dangerous tension between a judge's role as the 
neutral arbiter of the law and her role as an advocate trying to stem domestic 
violence. Moscat raises serious concerns regarding trial courts' interpretation of 
the scope of the Sixth Amendment. Furthermore, the Moscat decision calls into 
question fundamental presumptions of judicial neutrality and suggests that courts 
should reconsider the costs associated with becoming advocates in even worthy 
social causes such as the fight against domestic violence. 
